


**International
Communication
Agency**

United States of America

Washington, D. C. 20547

Office of the Director



January 26, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
William J. Casey
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

FROM: Charles Z. Wick *CW*
Director

SUBJECT: "Soviet Propaganda Alert Number 3"

Enclosed is the third issue of "Soviet Propaganda Alert" produced by our Office of Research under the auspices of Project Truth's Executive Committee.

In December, the Soviets continued to emphasize that they steadfastly maintain a humane, peaceful, and defense-oriented foreign policy, while the U.S. policy is bellicose, aggressive and inconsiderate of other nations. Specifically, Soviet propaganda:

- o harshly accused the U.S. of interfering in internal Polish affairs;
- o depicted the U.S. as conniving and insincere in nuclear arms limitation negotiations, more interested in attaining a one-sided advantage than in working out fair and mutually acceptable solutions;
- o portrayed the U.S. as a threat to stability and progress in the Third World; and
- o continued to charge that the U.S. is waging a campaign of slander and lies against the Soviet Union and socialism.

State Dept. review completed

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PROJECT TRUTH

Soviet Propaganda Alert

No. 3

January 11, 1982

Re: Project Truth

Summary

Soviet external propaganda in December continued to emphasize that the Soviet Union steadfastly maintains a humane, peaceful and defense-oriented foreign policy, while U.S. policy is bellicose, aggressive and inconsiderate of other nations.

In connection with specific international events and developments, Soviet propaganda efforts:

- o depicted the U.S. approach to negotiations on nuclear arms reduction in Europe as conniving and insincere (in contrast to the sincere and longstanding Soviet commitment to arms negotiations).

- o dwelled on issues of U.S. and NATO military policy in Europe, playing up alleged differences between the U.S. and some of its European allies on that subject. At the same time, the Soviets stressed their ties with Western Europe and their stake in common "European" concerns, implying unsubtly that the U.S. is an outside power stirring up trouble and seeking to further its own ends against the interests of all Europeans.

- o denounced Solidarity "extremists" and other elements in Poland for counterrevolutionary, antisocialist activities against the interests of the Polish people. Soviet media conveyed approval of the imposition of martial law. Since the crackdown, they have emphasized that conditions are generally calm and "returning to normal." Soviet propaganda harshly accused the U.S. of interfering in internal Polish affairs, charging, among other things, that the CIA was behind Solidarity.

- o attempted to weaken the impact of U.S. official statements and news media items critical of the Soviet Union by ridiculing them as "cynical fabrications" or "shopworn anti-Soviet cliches" designed to distract attention from the real evils perpetrated by the U.S. Media attacks were targeted on American officials and journalists associated with the alleged anti-Soviet propaganda campaign.

- o portrayed the U.S. as a threat to stability and progress in the Third World, particularly in the Middle East, Indian Ocean region and Latin America.

End Summary

**Office of Research
International Communication Agency**

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A. Arms Reduction Talks in Europe

Soviet media commentaries repeatedly chided the U.S. for behavior and statements by American leaders which allegedly revealed a cynical and unserious attitude toward arms limitation negotiations. Soviet propagandists claimed that the U.S. embarked on negotiations only under pressure (mainly from public opinion in Western Europe and the U.S. itself). While expressing their hope that the U.S. would negotiate in a "businesslike" and sincere fashion, Soviet commentators noted somberly that the U.S. had thus far not manifested its intentions to do so.

The U.S. was consistently portrayed as a reluctant and untrustworthy participant in arms negotiations, more interested in attaining a one-sided advantage than in working out fair and mutually acceptable solutions. Nonetheless, much of the Soviet reportage dealing directly with the newly begun Geneva arms talks was rather restrained in tone and played down the usual harsh anti-U.S. rhetoric. Soviet commentators rarely failed to inject a note of optimism alongside the usual cautions that reaching agreements at Geneva would not be easy. Soviet media appeared to be attempting to prepare the ground for negotiations without discouraging the development of popular opposition to U.S. arms policy in Europe.

Despite its relatively cautious treatment of the Geneva talks, Soviet propaganda throughout December did not ease efforts to depict the U.S. administration overall, and certain officials in particular (e.g., Secretaries Haig and Weinberger), as "war-mongering" and "saber-rattling." Frequent media items on such topics as the U.S. military budget, NATO talks, and measures to enhance U.S. and NATO military preparedness were intended to contribute to the image of U.S. militarism.

Constant references were made to Leonid Brezhnev's recent Bonn visit--termed his "peace mission"--and to the Soviet position on arms in Europe which Brezhnev set forth, once again, during that visit. Continuing the line of previous months, Soviet propaganda characterized Soviet arms reduction proposals as ideal, but proclaimed Moscow's willingness to seek compromise and consider other "serious" approaches. Brezhnev's Bonn statements were described as indicating the most fruitful direction for negotiations to take.

President Reagan's "zero option" proposal, on the other hand, was criticized as a blatantly unreasonable suggestion disingenuously put forth for sheer propaganda value--a "phony proposal" designed to deflect criticism from the Reagan Administration. Soviet propaganda charged that the West's selective method of counting weapons in Europe presented a false picture

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of Soviet strength. In reality, the Soviets contended, there currently exists a rough parity in Europe. In the Soviet view, the U.S. proposal sought to reestablish Western military superiority in Europe and ignored legitimate Soviet defense concerns.

Alleged U.S. willingness to sacrifice Europe in a "limited nuclear war" was, as in previous months, another major point of Soviet propaganda. A December 9 article in Literaturnaia gazeta, for example, described Europe as America's "nuclear football field"--"no matter which goalpost the 'goals' are kicked through, the Americans remain on the other side of the ocean ready to sacrifice the Europeans." Numerous media features seeking to portray the U.S. as the real threat to European security drew on the Soviet propaganda pamphlet Threat to Europe released in November.

B. Poland

Soviet coverage of the Polish situation before the declaration of martial law consisted largely of fierce attacks on Solidarity--accused of "providing cover for counterrevolution"--and on other elements of Polish society characterized as anti-socialist. After the crackdown, Soviet media, in addition to continuing their denunciations of Solidarity and the "anti-socialist threat" to Poland, endorsed the measures taken and began to stress that conditions in Poland were beginning to "return to normal."

The Soviet media have reported selectively on developments in Poland, exercising particular care in the choice of material for domestic Soviet audiences. Relatively little concrete information on what is going on in Poland has been offered by Soviet media. Instead, they have sought to pound away on several ideas which they would like to have the world believe. These include:

- o The vast majority of Poles did not support the Solidarity "extremists" and are relieved that Party and military leaders have reasserted control to return the country to normal. Soviet reportage is laced with quotes attributed to Polish citizens which criticize Solidarity and express support for the measures taken by the Military Council. Although "isolated" hot spots have been noted in Soviet reportage on Poland, a heavy emphasis has been placed on depicting the situation as generally peaceful with constant improvements in popular morale and progress in the efforts to resolve Polish economic problems.

- o While the Polish armed forces are playing a significant role in saving Poland from counterrevolution and helping it "return to normal," it is the leadership of the Polish Party which is of key importance. (Some Soviet defensiveness on this issue was indicated in commentaries which took pains to underplay

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the Polish Army's role and even managed to credit "the Party leadership" with the crackdown.)

o The Polish situation is an internal Polish matter and should be resolved by the Poles. Western speculations that Moscow is orchestrating events there and may intervene militarily are "slanderous lies" and merely part of the general U.S.-inspired anti-Soviet propaganda campaign that sees the Kremlin behind everything from international terrorism to peace marches in Europe. However, while repeating that there should not be outside interference in internal Polish affairs, Soviet media have asserted the USSR's special position in regard to Poland, noting that a threat to Poland "directly affects the security interests" of all the Warsaw Treaty nations.

o It is actually the U.S. and NATO that are interfering in domestic Polish affairs by holding meetings and issuing statements designed to support and incite counterrevolutionary activity, and to pressure the Polish government into taking actions--such as making concessions to Solidarity--deemed desirable by the West. According to the Soviets, Western "crude interference in the affairs of sovereign Poland" is taking other forms as well: economic blackmail; escalated "subversive propaganda" broadcasts into Poland by the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe; and provocative media sensationalization and distortion of events in Poland.

Such allegations of Western (especially American) interference and provocation in Poland have been a daily staple of Soviet media since mid-December. President Reagan's announcements of sanctions to be taken against Poland and the USSR triggered intensified attacks on the President personally and on American policy vis-a-vis Poland. The sanctions were denounced and the President accused of resorting to "lies" and "blackmail."

During the last week of December, Soviet propagandists sought to elaborate on their charges of "U.S. interference." They claimed to have "documentary proof" that the U.S.--and in particular the CIA--was deeply involved in trying to wrest Poland from the "socialist community" by supporting and inciting "coup-plotters." Soviet media also contended that the U.S. has been displeased with the course of "normalization" in Poland since the imposition of martial law, and is continuing efforts to destabilize the Polish situation and use it to exacerbate international tensions and provide a pretext for continued Western military buildup and antisocialist activity.

Other Soviet media themes which have become significant since U.S. sanctions against Poland and the USSR were announced are:

o The U.S. is attempting to force its NATO allies to join in the American "campaign of pressure" against Poland and the USSR,

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but this is meeting with little success. U.S. "official circles" disregard European interest in and need for cooperation and detente in Europe.

o Washington continues to "magnify" and "distort" events in Poland in a deliberate attempt to build tensions. This attempt, however, is doomed to failure.

o The U.S. decision on economic sanctions is "extremely in-human"--withholding of food as a means of exerting political pressure is particularly reprehensible. However, these sanctions will have no real effect. (Western sources are extensively cited by Soviet commentators making this point.)

o U.S. policy toward Poland since the imposition of martial law fits perfectly into the overall pattern of U.S. foreign policy--seeking to hinder detente, and discriminating against socialist countries on various pretexts while supporting truly repressive regimes simply because they are antisocialist.

To summarize, the overall effort of Soviet propaganda on Poland in the closing days of 1981 was to emphasize charges of continuing U.S. pressure against Poland and the socialist bloc while at the same time downplaying the actual international significance of Polish events. By taking this approach, Soviet propagandists hoped to: show a real need for martial law to repel outside threats to Poland; muster public opinion against the U.S.; divert attention from Soviet involvement in Poland; and demonstrate that declared Soviet foreign policy goals (detente, arms control, etc.) should and would not be jeopardized by developments in Poland.

C. Attacks on U.S. "Propaganda" Against the USSR

A longstanding common complaint in Soviet media has been that the U.S. is waging a campaign of slander and lies against the Soviet Union and socialism. In December there was an unrelenting flow of prominently featured media items on this theme, zeroing in on the Department of Defense publication Soviet Military Power, the State Department's Soviet Active Measures report, USICA and VOA in general, "Project Truth," Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, and network television news programming. Articles in Pravda, Izvestiia, Literaturnaia gazeta and other publications attacked "American anti-Soviet propaganda" for allegedly seeking to invent a mythical Soviet threat and to whip up anti-Soviet hysteria in order to divert American--and worldwide--anxieties over U.S. policy, in particular increased defense spending and deployment of new weapons.

Soviet media sought to discredit U.S. information efforts by, among other things, personal attacks on the integrity of the individuals and institutions involved. Protesting that "aggressive and provocative radio propaganda" from the West had

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escalated, the Soviets reiterated familiar charges that RFE-RL is staffed with "traitors and renegades" who formerly served the Nazis, and that the CIA is overseeing U.S. international broadcasting operations. A long article in the Izvestiia weekly supplement Nedelia (December 10) described ICA Director Charles Wick in disdainful tones as a millionaire who made his money in "real estate, show business and brothels," and a "cold warrior" who wants to return to the Truman era.

D. U.S. Policy and the Third World

While not introducing any new themes, Soviet propaganda keyed its repetition of the standard ones to current international situations. Major emphasis was on the Middle East and Latin America. Specific themes included the following:

- o Libya. The Soviets charged the U.S. with trying "to implement a plot against an independent and sovereign Arab state" and, in addition, with "reanimating the propaganda falsehood of the 'support' by the Soviet Union...for international terrorism, which had failed [to convince people] on all counts." The Soviets contended that the U.S. had no support worldwide for its accusations against Libya.
- o Middle East. Soviet propaganda called it "ridiculous" to think that the U.S. did not know in advance about and approve Israeli plans to annex the Golan Heights. By its consistent support of Israeli aggression in the Middle East, claimed Soviet media, the U.S. shared responsibility for the latest Israeli actions.
- o Latin America. The Soviets gave heavy coverage to the Moscow visit of Nicaragua's foreign minister, making use of the occasion to condemn the U.S. for a "flagrant campaign of threats" against Nicaragua aimed at forcing that country to cooperate with alleged U.S. imperialist policy in Latin America. Soviet media also criticized U.S. plans to increase "provocative" broadcasts to Cuba.
- o Indian Ocean. Propaganda attacks focused on the presence of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force (referred to as evidence of escalating imperialist military power), and alleged U.S. failure to join efforts to secure peace in the region.
- o Afghanistan. Complementing glowing accounts of beneficent Soviet activity in Afghanistan were condemnations of the Western media for "creating lies" about the Afghanistan situation. The U.S., China and Pakistan were accused of continuing to incite and support "bandit activity," thus blocking complete normalization of conditions in Afghanistan. Stories portrayed Soviet soliders serving in Afghanistan as conscientious young citizens fulfilling their "internationalist duty" under trying conditions. Babrak Karmal's praise for Soviet assistance was also reported at length.

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E. Human Rights

On the occasion of UN Human Rights Day (December 10), Soviet media self-righteously described the socialist states as the true defenders of the most important of all human rights--the right to live in a peaceful world--inasmuch as "socialism and peace are indivisible." Replaying familiar themes, Soviet commentaries contrasted the rights enjoyed by citizens of socialist countries--right to a job, to free universal education, free health care, etc.--with the lack of rights in Western capitalist societies, as evidenced, they noted, by high rates of unemployment, illiteracy, and expensive medical care.

Some of the Soviet propaganda on human rights may have been designed especially as a counterweight to Western media coverage of Andrei Sakharov and Elena Bonner's hunger strike in defense of Liza Alexeeva's right to emigrate to join her husband (Bonner's son, Sakharov's stepson). But the Soviet media regularly feature such material and rarely let suitable opportunities such as Human Rights Day pass without comment. Soviet media treatment of the Sakharov hunger strike itself consisted, predictably, of extremely cryptic reporting of events themselves along with generalized articles criticizing Sakharov, Alexeeva and others involved. The hunger strike was characterized in some Soviet sources as a "provocation" intended to promote Western opposition to detente.

F. Brezhnev's Birthday

The Soviet news media were packed with material dedicated to Leonid Brezhnev on the occasion of his 75th birthday, celebrated on December 19. Birthday-related items included congratulations and praise from numerous Soviet Party and government organizations; congratulatory messages from foreign communist parties and foreign government leaders; excerpts from Brezhnev's books; biographical features; speeches by Politburo members; reports on exhibits, plays, and other events devoted to Leonid Ilich; poems and songs; and much, much more--all highly laudatory.

Western observers noted several characteristics of the birthday adulation. Brezhnev was praised for his lifelong dedication to the cause of peace. At the same time, relatively great attention was focused on his military experience and ties to the military, perhaps underscoring the prestige and significance of that institution. Controversial international issues were totally avoided in the many official speeches; there was no mention of Poland. There were, however, references to serious Soviet economic problems and the need to solve them.

Prepared by: PGM/R Staff

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

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Remarks:

ASL
Executive Secretary

1/14/82
Date